Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, Spring Shield: What Each Operation Was and Which Claims Circulate

Why It Matters

Türkiye's four northern Syria operations (2016, 2018, 2019, 2020) and the Claw series in northern Iraq are among the most contested cross-border campaigns of the past decade. They are often described as one 'invasion', but they had different dates, adversaries, legal framing and outcomes. This guide separates them, sets out what Ankara states, what the UN, EU and US have said, and which claims are documented, disputed or unsupported. It belongs to the Counter-Terrorism at Source desk of Disinfo Monitor.

Background

The operations followed the 2011 Syrian conflict, the rise of DAESH (ISIS) and the expansion of the PYD/YPG, which Ankara calls the Syrian branch of the PKK, along Türkiye's roughly 900 km Syrian frontier. The PKK has waged an armed campaign against Türkiye since 1984. It is listed as a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States and the European Union, and Ankara notes that NATO allies share this designation. For Ankara's wider doctrine, see Regional Order on counter-terrorism at source.

The four Syria operations at a glance

Operation	Dates	Area	Stated objective (Ankara)	Main opposing forces
Euphrates Shield	2016-08-24 to 2017-03-29	Jarablus to al-Bab	Clear DAESH from the border; stop PYD/YPG cantons linking up	DAESH; YPG-linked forces
Olive Branch	2018-01-20 to March 2018 (Afrin city taken 2018-03-18)	Afrin	Remove PYD/YPG from Afrin	YPG
Peace Spring	2019-10-09; ceasefire 2019-10-17; Sochi memorandum 2019-10-22	Tal Abyad to Ras al-Ayn	Create a safe zone; remove YPG from the border strip	YPG / SDF
Spring Shield	2020-02-27 to 2020-03-05	Idlib	Respond to the deadly strike on Turkish forces; halt the Syrian government offensive	Syrian government forces

Operation by operation

Euphrates Shield was Türkiye's first large ground operation in Syria. Turkish forces and Syrian opposition units took Jarablus in August 2016 and al-Bab in February 2017. Ankara describes it as the only direct ground combat against DAESH by a NATO member and cites more than 4,000 DAESH militants neutralised. These are Turkish government figures, not independently audited.

Olive Branch targeted Afrin, a Kurdish-majority enclave controlled by the PYD/YPG. Turkish forces and Syrian opposition factions took Afrin city on 18 March 2018. The US-led coalition was not operating in Afrin, but Washington was partnered with the YPG-led SDF elsewhere, which made the operation a source of NATO-ally friction.

Peace Spring began after the US repositioned troops away from the border area. It covered a stretch of roughly 120 km between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. A US-brokered pause was announced on 17 October 2019. A Russia–Türkiye memorandum signed in Sochi on 22 October 2019 provided for YPG withdrawal from a 30 km strip and joint patrols.

Spring Shield differed in kind. It followed an air strike on 27 February 2020 that killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in Idlib, which Ankara attributed to Syrian government forces. It was fought against government units rather than a listed terrorist group. A Russia–Türkiye protocol ended it on 5 March 2020 and set up joint patrols along the M4 highway. Ankara cites the 2018 Sochi Idlib memorandum and its observation posts as context.

The Claw series in northern Iraq

The Claw (Pençe) operations began in May 2019 against PKK positions in the Haftanin area. They were followed by Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger (June 2020), Claw-Lock (April 2022, Metina, Zap and Avashin-Basyan) and the Claw-Sword air operation (November 2022), launched after the Istanbul İstiklal Avenue bombing, which Ankara attributed to PKK/PYD-YPG networks. Iraq's federal government has repeatedly protested violations of its sovereignty. In March 2024 its National Security Council nonetheless declared the PKK a banned organisation, and Baghdad and Ankara have since expanded security cooperation.

Key Players & Positions

The positions below are summarised with attribution, and the claims are grouped by theme.

Claim 1: civilian harm and abuses

• What critics say: The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN human rights office (OHCHR), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented civilian casualties and abuses in these operations. These include looting and property seizures in Afrin in 2018, and in 2019 the killing of Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf, which OHCHR described as an apparent summary execution by an allied armed group. Amnesty accused Turkish forces and allied groups of possible war crimes in a 2019 report.
• What Ankara says: The Ministry of National Defence (MSB) says forces apply precision and avoid civilians, cultural and religious sites. Ankara rejects the war-crimes allegations and says violations by individuals are investigated.
• Assessment: Abuses by allied Syrian factions are documented by multiple independent bodies. Responsibility for specific incidents is disputed, so verify each incident against its original report.

Claim 2: demographic engineering

• What critics say: Kurdish representatives, UN investigators and rights groups report displacement of Kurdish residents from Afrin and the Tal Abyad–Ras al-Ayn area, and settlement of others. UN agencies reported more than 100,000 displaced during Peace Spring.
• What Ankara says: Ankara denies any policy of demographic change. It says the operations allowed Syrians of all ethnic backgrounds, including Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, to return voluntarily, and cites returns in the hundreds of thousands. It also points to earlier reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty (2015) of forced displacement of Arab villagers by YPG forces.
• Assessment: Both displacement and returns occurred. Counts of who returned, who was displaced and why vary widely by source.

Claim 3: support for proxies

• What critics say: The Syrian National Army (SNA), the opposition umbrella Ankara supports, is described as a Turkish proxy, and some factions as extremist or abusive.
• What Ankara says: The SNA is a Syrian opposition structure fighting alongside the Turkish Armed Forces. Ankara rejects claims of support for DAESH; see Fact Check: Did Türkiye Support ISIS? for the record on designation, operations and border controls.

Claim 4: legality

• Syria's former government, Russia and Iran described the operations as violations of Syrian sovereignty. After the government's fall in December 2024, Damascus's new authorities have pursued their own arrangements with the SDF.
• The EU: EU foreign ministers condemned Peace Spring on 14 October 2019, called for it to stop, and agreed on national arms export restrictions, while recognising legitimate Turkish security concerns.
• The US: Washington has listed the PKK as a terrorist organisation since 1997, treated the YPG-led SDF as a counter-DAESH partner and has not listed the YPG. In October 2019 the executive branch imposed and then lifted sanctions, and Congress passed a resolution criticising the operation.
• Legal scholars: Debate centres on whether Article 51 permits force on another state's territory against non-state actors where the host state is 'unable or unwilling', and on proportionality. Article 51 notification letters are covered in The Worldlogue's explainer and are not repeated here.

Türkiye's Security & Legal Doctrine

• Self-defence under Article 51. Ankara states in letters to the UN Security Council and in Foreign Ministry (MFA) texts that the operations respond to armed attacks and imminent threats from the PKK/PYD-YPG and DAESH, and are consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Security Council counter-terrorism resolutions. It also cites the 1998 Adana Agreement with Syria, under which Damascus undertook not to support the PKK. Sources: MFA statements and UN letters.
• YPG as the PKK's Syrian branch. According to the MFA and the Presidency, the PYD/YPG shares leadership, cadres and ideology with the PKK/KCK. Ankara argues that fighting DAESH does not remove this link and that the PKK listing by Türkiye, the US and the EU should apply in substance to its affiliates. Sources: MFA, Presidency.
• One state, one army. Ankara says it supports Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, citing UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), and the principle that Syria should have a single state and army. It has welcomed the integration of the SDF into state structures, as in the March 2025 Damascus–SDF agreement. Sources: MFA, Presidency.
• Returns and refugee burden. Türkiye hosted one of the world's largest refugee populations, above 3.5 million Syrians at its peak. Officials describe the cleared areas as enabling voluntary, safe returns. Sources: MSB, Ministry of Interior, Presidency.
• Security with a political track. Ankara links the operations to its 'Terror-Free Türkiye' initiative. The PKK announced its dissolution in May 2025, and Ankara calls for verified disarmament under the rule of law. Sources: Presidency, Directorate of Communications.

Source Comparison

Question	Common international framing	Turkish primary sources	What to verify
Are the operations one campaign?	A single 'invasion' of Syria	Four operations with distinct objectives	Dates and adversaries per operation
Who is the YPG?	A partner against DAESH	The Syrian branch of the PKK	Official US, EU and Turkish statements
Civilian harm	UN and NGO documentation of violations	MSB statements on precision	Original UN, Amnesty and HRW reports against MSB briefings
Demographic change	Displacement and resettlement	Voluntary returns	Displacement and return counts, with their methodology
Legality	Sovereignty violation; contested use of Article 51	Article 51 notifications, Adana Agreement	UN letters and the Security Council record
Spring Shield	Part of the same 'occupation'	Response to the strike on Turkish forces; ended by the Moscow Protocol	The text of the 2020-03-05 protocol

For the recurring narratives behind these gaps, see The Disinformation Playbook on Türkiye's Security Policy. For a broader cross-check against primary documents, see Crossroads Review's fact-check overview. To locate MSB briefings and UN letters, use Where to Find Primary Sources on Türkiye. For weapons claims, use Verifying Claims About Turkish Drones and Weapons.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella structure, designated a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States and the EU.
• PYD/YPG/SDF: The Syrian Kurdish party, its armed wing and the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Ankara treats the first two as PKK affiliates; Washington partnered with the SDF against DAESH.
• DAESH: Arabic acronym for ISIS.
• SNA: The Syrian National Army, an opposition grouping supported by Türkiye.
• Article 51: The UN Charter provision recognising states' inherent right of individual and collective self-defence against an armed attack, subject to reporting to the Security Council.
• Terror-Free Türkiye: The Turkish initiative to end PKK violence through security, legal and political steps.

Related reading: Regions & Powers on cross-border operations and Article 51, Editorial Principles and Primary-Source Standards, and Disinfo Monitor's home page.

Disinfo Monitor presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Security & Legal Doctrine' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

By the Disinfo Monitor Editorial Team.